With the help of location-based services (LBS), it makes driving more convience for drivers. However, because the untrusted LBS server may leak the user's location information, the user's privacy is threatened. Moreover, the existing methods of location privacy protection do not take into account the impact of context on privacy protection demand. In addition, heterogeneous data sensed by vehicles also increases the complexity of application development. In order to solve the above problems, we propose a context-based location privacy protection middleware architecture, named PP-OSGi. The middleware simplifies application development by shielding the heterogeneity of vehicle sensed data and upper-layer applications. Furthermore, in order to protect the real location information of service request vehicles under different vehicle densities in a certain area, we propose a dynamically adjustable k-anonymous (DAK) algorithm and a location privacy protection (DLP) algorithm based on a dummy location, which are all encapsulated in PP-OSGi. The DAK and DLP algorithms dynamically determine the location privacy protection strength in different contexts based on the user's location privacy preference model, select an anonymous group of neighboring vehicles to construct a anonymous area, and obtain a dummy location of the service request vehicle. The experimental results show that, under the premise of protecting the location privacy of vehicles, the success rate of service requests is improved and the communication cost between vehicles is reduced. INDEX TERMS Context, K-anonymous, location privacy preference, middleware, VANET.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND Nowadays, the Internet of Vehicles (IOV) technology has emerged as the times require, which has aroused great concern in the research and industrial circles. The application of IOV is mainly divided into Emergency Rescue System, Intelligent Navigation System, Intelligent Transportation System, Vehicle Social Network, etc [1] . Vehicle Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is a special MANET, which has the characteristics of highly dynamic topology, frequent link disruptions, mobility predictability, localized communication, propagation models, time constraints, energy and storage capabilities [2] . The VANET consists of a vehicle or vehicle and a roadside unit (RSU), where the vehicles are used as mobile nodes limited to the road topology, equipped with The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiangxue Li . CPU, memory, global positioning system (GPS) locator, wireless communication module, speed sensors and other devices. They communicate with each other via wireless local area networks (WLANs) [3] , including vehicles and vehicles (V2V) [4] , [5] , vehicles and roadside units (V2R), vehicles to remote infrastructure (V2I) and vehicles to the cloud.
B. MOTIVATION
With the popularization and promotion of IOV and positioning technology in daily life, the positioning accuracy is getting higher and higher [6] , and the location-based IOV services are becoming more and more abundant, resulting in a significant increase in the number of IOV users. Some problems, such as information security and privacy leakage, have also emerged. Vehicles have become another way for attackers to steal user privacy. Such as location-based services provide a variety of services for vehicles, at the same time, it may also bring security risks of location information leakage. For example, the vehicle node can sense and obtain the position and speed of other vehicles, thereby notifying other drivers that they can respond to the received information immediately under special circumstances. Information such as the location and speed of these vehicles is broadcast to neighboring nodes or remote vehicles via multi-hop routing [7] . In addition, vehicles can also access LBS by accessing the RSU, such as finding the nearest gas station, supermarket and hotel information. While a driver is in the process of acquiring location-based services, the vehicle needs to periodically [8] broadcast safety messages to surrounding nodes, which also include information such as vehicle identifiable identity, current location, driving speed, and so on.
An attacker can connect external data sources or background knowledge by ''location'' to determine the location or the user sending the message. For example, [9] proposed a spatial background knowledge attack model, assuming that the user sends an LBS request from the location loc(x, y) and does not want to expose his location information, and uses the location fuzzy anonymity method to generate the anonymous domain AR containing the user location. If the AR area is completely contained in a specific disclosed area M, such as a large shopping mall, a train station, etc., it is easy for the attacker to infer that the user is in the area M according to the background semantic information of the area M. Marco Gruteser [10] paid attention to the location privacy protection problem in location-based services, and proposed a location connection attack, that is, attackers use the location in the query as a pseudo-identifier to establish an association between the user identifier and the query record, and leak the user identifier and query content. In a location-attached attack, the background knowledge of attackers is the exact location of the user. In addition,the untrusted LBS server can also obtain all the information about the service requester vehicle [11] . Memo et al. [12] proposed a new hybrid zone and dynamic pseudonym trust management system, designed to prevent attackers from under privacy-enhanced road networks. When the pseudonym is expired, the dynamic pseudonym trust management system is proposed with the help of the report server, and a series of simulations are carried out under many trust attack models. This method has high flexibility for various attacks.
The leakage of location privacy will seriously affect user's identity privacy [13] , If these safety information is obtained by illegal vehicles or attackers and disguised as ordinary vehicles, they will associate it with a specific vehicle, track its driving track, analyze its driving habits, get the owner's family location, workplace, etc., and even judge the owner's real identity, commit other criminal acts. Comprehensive analysis of the current research work shows that the location privacy protection methods in the IOV can be roughly divided into three categories: k-anonymity scheme, mixed zone scheme [14] , [15] , group navigation scheme [16] .However, the existing location privacy protection method does not consider the user's location privacy preference, and cannot protect the user's privacy while satisfying the user's personal location preference. Therefore, it is urgent to design a location privacy protection method that satisfies the user's personalized to solve these problems.
In addition, the heterogeneity of sensing devices, communication protocols, and application software of different vehicles leads to high development and maintenance costs. The middleware is distributed software which runs between embedded devices, operating systems and application software. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the vehicle middleware technology between the application system and the underlying device to reduce the coupling between the software and the hardware and improve the development efficiency.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We use a location privacy protection scenario to implement location privacy protection in different contexts of VANET as illustrated in Fig. 1 . In this study, VANET is composed of vehicles, RSUs, and service providers that face the urban environments. This study assumes that the RSU is unreliable, and the vehicle of a neighbor is reliable. In the case where the service requester vehicle is driving on the road and asks for a nearby restaurant between home and school, it must share its real location to the RSU to obtain an accurate neighbor service. If the RSU is unreliable, then the location information of the service requester vehicle will be leaked. Moreover, the k of the vehicle is likely to be different at home and school such as k 1 and k 2 . We propose a location privacy preference model to forecast the k at home and school and then obtain location information from neighbor vehicles by broadcasting messages to satisfy the k-anonymity, thereby realizing the location privacy protection of the service requester vehicle and obtaining exact service query results. The present study offers the following noticeable contributions: 1) We design a PP-OSGi middleware for a vehicular embedded system to implement location privacy protection that shields the heterogeneity of the underlying equipments and upper applications of different vehicles to simplify the complexity of developing applications. 2) For location privacy leakage,and the existing location privacy protection methods do not take into account the FIGURE 1. Location privacy protection scenario. VOLUME 8, 2020 different privacy preferences of users in different contexts, we design a dynamically adjustable k-anonymous (DAK) algorithm. 3) When the vehicle density is sparse, the location information of the neighboring vehicle collected by the service requester does not satisfy the privacy request k of the service requester, and some of the classic dummy location-based location privacy protection methods generate dummy locations that are unreachable such as mountains or rivers. Therefore, we propose a privacy protection (DLP) algorithm based on dummy location for areas with sparse vehicle density.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related works are discussed in Section II. Section III introduces a system model. We present the propose DAK algorithm in Section IV. We present the propose DLP algorithm in Section V. The performance evaluation is presented in Section VI. Finally, the conclusions drawn and future works are specified in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
With the development of positioning technology, more and more methods are used to improve positioning accuracy.Zhu et al [17] proposed a vehicle positioning approach by employing supporting vector machine for regression (SVR) to achieve accurate and reliable vehicle position and trajectory prediction based on GOI. The low-dimensional non-linear GOI trajectory data is transferred into high-dimensional linear problems by using kernel function so that it reduces the computational complexity and improves positioning accuracy. Luo et al [18] proposed an indoor cooperative localization and tracking algorithm (CLTA) based on grid. In the offline phase, a cooperative localization fingerprint database was established based on reliable nodes. In the online phase, a region overlapping mechanism was used to narrow location area in multi-network surroundings at first. Then,they used a prediction mechanism to predict the mobile target position which further narrow the location area and effectively improve positioning accuracy.
In order to better protect user location privacy,several methods have been proposed to address the privacy problem. The context-aware based on pseudonym scheme provides numerous pseudonyms for vehicles without revealing its true identity [19] , [20] . [19] introduced location-aware location privacy protection, users can define the dynamics and diverse privacy requirements of different locations according to their preferences, and find the smallest invisible area for each location request to meet the different privacy requirements. However, the invisible area is not considered to be small and the anonymous location is too close to the real location. [20] proposed a context-based location privacy scheme (CLPS), which involves a pseudonym change strategy that allows a vehicle to effectively change its pseudonym according to its context and evaluate whether the change in pseudonym is successful. The use of a pseudonym can protect the real identity of a vehicle, but the pseudonym should be changed regularly. In communication agent methods, the vehicles should form a group first [16] , and then select a group leader (GL) that represents the interests of all group members, thereby concealing the individual and achieving privacy protection. However, the GL, as a gateway, may not be within the range of the group, which leads to abnormal termination of communication, considering the rapid change in the VANET topology. Methods based on privacy information retrieval (PIR) protect user privacy by encrypting location data [21] , [22] . These methods demonstrate protection strength without excessive exposure of location information, which is stored in the database of LBS servers. However, communication and computing costs of these methods are quite high.
Considering the impact of the environment on location privacy when the system is threatened, [23] proposes a new location privacy metric related to the surrounding environment, and a stochastic model that can capture spatial changes along the user path, and develops a new stop-based best LBS access scheme. [24] proposed a co-location privacypreserving system framework, the key technologies of the system is location privacy-preserving agent. It defines novel calculation method of relation strength based on bi-direction interaction frequency between user and friends, and designs two algorithms based on user's coordination and co-location information concealment and time adjustment which is suitable for different location privacy-preserving scenarios, but It uses a centralized location protection method that is vulnerable to malicious attacks by attackers.
The privacy protection method of k-anonymity is mainly divided into two categories as follows: whether the system structure is based on the centralized location anonymizer or not. [25] presented a spatial and temporal cloaking method with k-anonymity. In [25] , a CR with k users is used as a substitute for the real location, and the LBS cannot distinguish one user from the other k-1 users. [26] proposed a clique cloak method to implement a personalized k-anonymity in which users can adjust their level of anonymity. However, time, space, and k are difficult to simultaneously balance. [27] proposes a region-of interest division-based algorithm to Preserve the location Privacy of mobile device users in location-based Cyber Services (PPCS), which adds semantic location information that an attacker may use, and generates dummy locations based on entropy, and divide the user region-of interest into n fan-shaped areas, calculate the position entropy of each area, and finally select the position with the largest position entropy to replace the real position of the user, and realize the location privacy protection of the mobile user.
The privacy protection method of the non-centralized location anonymizer is adopted. In the peer-to-peer (P2P) spatial cloaking algorithm [28] , user groups are formed by the self-organization communication among users, and then the minimum boundary rectangle of the user within the group is calculated. The user initiates the query and randomly selects a neighbor from the group as the agent to query the location service provider for the user and transmit the results to the user. These algorithms prevent the single point of failure and concentration of performance bottlenecks, but queries based on anonymous areas still require numerous computations and large communication costs. Moreover the location distribution of k-1 neighbor users is disregarded, and the cloaked location of which is near the service requester, thereby reducing the location privacy protection of the users. Moreover, the location privacy preference has the same k when the location and time contexts of a user's vehicle change.
Furthermore, [29] designed a context-aware middleware based on vehicle safety considerations to shield the heterogeneity of the underlying equipments and upper applications of different vehicles. [30] introduced a robust middleware protection with high privacy security through encryption to ensure data transmission. Thus, the attacker cannot freely access the user database, but the calculation is complex.
Due to similar velocity and short changes, internal attacker guesses easily known communication and location information due to location information of vehicle on tracking, which may expose adversary private information [31] , [32] . [31] proposed distance and cluster-based energy pseudonyms changing method for road network. A distance and energy based clustering routing service is proposed on the road network. The cluster head selection depends on a random amount of distance and energy to change the pseudonym of the vehicle. Each interval of the cluster head vehicle is established while the mode of operation is selected, and the cluster member is notified of the selected mode by a beacon signal. The cluster head vehicle node performs a pseudonym change based on the predicted distance and energy of the cluster members to use cluster optimization. Data for the entire network is sent to the reporting server through these nodes near the RSU, and vehicles in the area will use less energy to change the pseudonym. Thereby protecting the privacy of the vehicle. [32] proposes a network security architecture based on the three technologies of Markov model, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Virtual Honeypot Device (VHD), which classifies edge devices and stores the attacks of identified malicious devices, increased recognition success rate for malicious devices at the same time reducing false alarm rate.
Our PP-OSGi middleware realizes location privacy protection and shields the underlying equipments and the upper applications of heterogeneity in the VANET. The DAK and DLP algorithm predicts the k of the service requester in different contexts to dynamically control whether we focus on the QoS or the location privacy level. Furthermore, we obtain the anonymity group by calculating the polygonal area to obtain a large CR to maximize the required privacy level.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED MIDDLEWARE
This section includes the system model and the proposed PP-OSGi middleware architecture.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
VANET framework in this study is composed of N vehicles, RSUs and service providers. The set of vehicles is denoted as SV = {V 1 , V 2 ,. . . , V N }, and each vehicle in SV can obtain its 2D coordinates by using the GPS. The 2D coor-
Every vehicle is equipped with communication devices and has a communication radius of R v and R r with vehicle and RSU, respectively. The communication modes in this network include vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-RSU, and RSUto-RSU. Moreover, each vehicle has a storage device that can store the user history services and location privacy protection records.
A service request message based on greedy perimeter stateless routing protocol (GPSR) is passed to the service directory (RSU) when a vehicle must obtain a LBS [33] ; furthermore, the service request message is defined as
where V id is the unique id identifier of the vehicle in the network, V type is the vehicle request service type, and V location is the vehicle location, R 0 is the communication radius, τ is the time when the request was created. Service providers can register service information to the local service directory RSU through the internet. The service registry is defined as a Ser (S id , S type , S location , R T ), where S id is the service id, which is unique in the network; S type represents service type, S location is the location of the service provider. In addition, R T is the service registration time.The main parameters are shown in Table 1 .
In the RSU-centric service inquiry process,In order to protect the true identity of the vehicle,we encrypt the ID of the service request vehicle by MD5 encryption technology. The MD5 encryption method is simple to calculate and has strong anti-modification. Mapping relationship makes the real Id and virtual Id of service requesting vehicle correspond one to one and RSU dynamic update storage request vehicle Id and mapping Id. After the service inquiry is completed, the RSU deletes the vehicle Id and the encrypted vehicle Id.
B. PP-OSGI
The PP-OSGi middleware is based on the OSGi architecture and has six bundles as follows: device, data storage library, location privacy protection, historical database, service discovery, and DssOSGi bundle [34] , as shown in Fig. 2 .
(1) Device bundle. Vehicular embedded devices include camera, position, and speed sensor. The basic services that can be provided are packaged in the device bundle. The middleware platform can control devices and access the services provided by these devices through the device bundle. This bundle can also provide information about the location, speed, and direction of the vehicle.
(2) Historical database bundles. The data repository bundle stores the sensor data of a vehicle and the context information received from the vehicle node of the neighbor. The history database bundle stores user's history services and location. (3) DssOSGi bundle. Vehicles can communicate with other vehicles through the DssOSGi bundle. The vehicle communicates with the RSU through the WLAN. The vehicle service request is sent to the RSU based on the GPSR protocol, and the service request is sent to the RSU with the nearby vehicle as the relay node. Vehicles communicate with other vehicles through dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) with the help of the DssOSGi bundle, which sends the vehicle driving-related information, such as turning intention, location and time context, and driving status to other vehicles.
(4) Location privacy protection bundle. This bundle is the core of our middleware. The bundle is first preprocessed to obtain a LBS, while the location privacy preference model analyzes the historical database location privacy protection to predict k. Preprocess bundle analyzes and calculates whether the number of neighbor vehicle location information reach αk. If the number of location information is enough, the DAK algorithm is used to protect the location privacy. On the other hand, the service content that can be published to RSUs is obtained by using DLP algorithm. These two algorithms are encapsulated in anonymous processing modules.
(5) Service selection bundle. This bundle registers service to the RSU through WLAN; thus, the service request vehicle can access all registered services of the required type and select the final service by calculating the distance of the service request vehicle and the services returned by the RSU. Then, the service request vehicle collaborates with a navigation system equipment, such as the guidance of service for users. Certain service information is stored in the historical database bundle after the user utilizes the service.
The middleware layer is the research focus of PP-OSGi and is logically located at the application layer. The roadside unit RSU serves as a service registration center and is a centralized service catalog, which implements service query for the service request vehicle. At the same time, the service provider acts as a service provider to register its services to the RSU. Next, the workflow of middleware layer is described.
The device layer collects and stores the real-time context information of the vehicle, such as time, location, speed, etc., then analyzes and processes the original context information, transmits the data to the middleware layer through the network layer, and standardizes the data in the middleware layer to provide data support for the upper layer application. When the application layer makes a service request, the service request generator at the middleware layer generates a description of the contract based on the service request. The service attribute analyzer determines whether it is a location-based service based on the service request content attribute. If it is a location-based service, the service request content needs to be protected by the location privacy protector, and then sent to the RSU through the WLAN, and vice versa, directly sent to the RSU for service inquiry. When location protection is performed, the user's privacy needs are predicted by analyzing the location privacy history records in the historical database according to the location privacy preference model. Then the preprocessor analyses and calculates whether the number of neighbor vehicle location information collected satisfies αk. If satisfied, use the DAK algorithm, instead use the DLP algorithm to achieve location protection, and finally get the service that can be published to RSU to complete the service query. Thereby protecting the privacy of the vehicle in Fig. 3 .
Our PP-OSGi middleware can realize privacy protection for a vehicular embedded system for vehicles when user request service, of which calculation is simple. It also shields the heterogeneity of underlying equipments and upper applications in different vehicles, thereby simplifying the complexity of application development. 
IV. DAK ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose the DAK algorithm. Our proposed algorithm consists of three steps as follows: (1) establish the location privacy preference model to predict the k of the service requester vehicle, (2) construct a large CR to achieve k-anonymity, and (3) acquire accurate service.
A. LOCATION PRIVACY PREFERENCE MODEL
The user location privacy preference model first generates user-context k-anonymous matrix A based on the user history database. Then, the similarity between different contexts is calculated to establish the context similarity matrix. Finally, k is predicted based on the context similarity matrix.
In the related recommendation system based on user collaborative filtering, the preference of users is expressed as a triplet (user, item, and rate), that is, the user provides the rate of an item by using previously collected user data. The items include movies, musics, and other items that we recommend to users. The rate can be continuous (e.g., a number between 0 and 1) or discrete (e.g., like and dislike or from 1 to 10 stars).
We must structure the user-context k-anonymous matrix A to apply the user-user collaborative filtering in recommendations for location privacy preferences in our scheme. First, we must convert the location privacy preferences of users to items in different contexts (e.g., times and locations). Context information is the key information source for the system to acquire different services, and vehicles in the VANET are equipped with many sensing devices to obtain the rich real-time context information of vehicles. [35] said that any information context is used to describe the state of the entity, the entity may be a person, location or time related to the interaction between users and applications (including the user and the application itself). In this study, we use the combination of location and time attributes to express contexts.
Subsequently, the rate is replaced with k, which is related to k-anonymity. Therefore, A contains three basic data (i.e., User, Context, and k). User represents user registration information; Context represents the semantic location context L and time context T ; and L is a set of semantic locations (Home, Food, Leisure, Mall, Hotel, School, and Hospital). T is a set of semantic time (Morning, Noon, Afternoon, Evening, and Night). For example, Table 2 represents user-context k-anonymous matrix for six 
Euclidean similarity calculation method is a common and intuitive similarity algorithm. This study uses the Euclidean method to calculate the similarity between two contexts in Eq. (1):
where (a i , b i ) are the coordinates of contexts a and b in the i dimension. The smaller the Euclidean distance, the higher the similarity between the two contexts. Conversely, the greater the Euclidean distance, the lower the two context similarities. The context similarity calculation formula is expressed in Eq. (2):
where sim(a, b) (1 ≤ a, b ≤ n) indicates the similarity between contexts a and b. The similarity degree is similar to that of Eq. (1), and the similarity is high. The similarity degree is equal to 1, thereby indicating that the two information points coincide and their characteristics are identical. A similarity of 0 denotes that the Euclidean distance between two information points is infinite and has no similarity. Then we calculate the similarity matrix P sim by using Eq. (3):
where sim i,m (1 ≤ i, m ≤ n) is the similarity between contexts i and m. Therefore, we can obtain contexts set M a = i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i e which is more similar to context a than other contexts, such as sim(a, i 1 ) is the maximum value, sim(a, i 2 ) is the second one. Then, we predict the k of service requester vehicle V in context a through Eq. (4): where k e is the similarity of service request vehicles at Context e(e ∈ M a ).
B. CLOAKED LOCATION AND SERVICE SELECTION
First, we select neighbor vehicles as the anonymity group to construct the CR by broadcasting the beacon information. Then, we calculate the center and real query radius of the CR instead of the real position of the service request vehicle to hidden. Finally, we send the service requester to the nearby RSU. Thus we can acquire an accurate service by expanding the query radius and calculating the distance between the vehicle and services returned by the RSU.
In the VANET, the service requester vehicle periodically broadcasts the beacon information of road conditions, such as location and speed information. Therefore, each vehicle can dynamically recognize the location of its neighbor vehicles without relying on the centralized location anonymizer. V broadcasts a node discovery message when the service requester vehicle V is on the road to acquire the location information of n neighbor vehicles. The location of the neighbor vehicle node is stored in the location information list L when the distance D of V and the neighbor vehicle node satisfy Eq. (5) and n ≤ αk (α > 1), where α is related to the number of vehicles in the region that the vehicle enters:
where r min is the minimum anonymous radius; (x, y) is the coordinate of the V, respectively; (x j , y j ) are the latitude and longitude of the neighbor vehicle, correspondingly. Certain solutions did not expect that the location of the collection of neighboring vehicles might be near the service requester vehicle V. The adversary can directly locate the service request vehicle in small areas, such as a gas station, which may not necessarily guess the actual position. Therefore, we should consider the location distribution of the V and neighbor vehicles to form an anonymous group L to structure a large CR as depicted in Fig. 4 . In this case, we should select five neighbor vehicles to form an anonymous group L, where k is set to 6.
In several solutions in Fig. 4(a) , the blue neighbor vehicles are selected to form an anonymous group, which is close to the V. Obviously, we prefer the solution in Fig. 4(b) ), where the other yellow neighbor vehicles are dispersed as far as possible. Thus, we should design a scheme to carefully select neighbor vehicles among the location information list L to improve the privacy level. A fundamental question is structuring a large CR to maximize the required privacy level. The location distribution is dispersed when the polygonal area formed by the anonymous group is large. We consider a case presented in Fig. 4 , where k is set to 6. Twelve locations of neighbor vehicles are collected for storage in the location information list L = {L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , . . . , L 12 }, and the anonymous group L = {L V }, where L V is the location of V. First, we choose the L 1 to join L, which distance from V is at max compared with the neighbor vehicle in L. Then, we filter L 1 from L, hence L = {L 2 , L 3 , . . . , L 12 }. Next, we select the third candidate location from L. At this point, we compute the polygonal area formed by L with a neighbor vehicle from L. If S L,L 3 is the maximum value, then we will add L 3 to L and remove L 3 from L. We also acquire the max polygonal area S L,L 7 formed by L with neighbor vehicle L 7 from L to obtain the fourth candidate location. The anonymous group is
Therefore, we can obtain the final anonymous group L =
where the distribution of L is dispersed, and the CR is large. Therefore, we select the anonymous group to structure a large CR based on the polygonal area. The formula of the polygonal area S LiL , L i ∈ L is expressed in Eq. (6):
owing to several methods that can hide their location information by sending all location information of the anonymous group to the RSU, these methods may expose the location of other vehicles to leak privacy. Moreover, these methods yield additional query results for service queries by using anonymous groups to replace the real location, which increases communication and computation costs. Therefore, we calculate the center of the anonymous group V center and the real query radius R to replace the real location of V and initial query radius R 0 through Eq. (7) and Eq. (8):
where (x i , y i ) is the coordinates of vehicles in the anonymous group, respectively; and (x c , y c ) are the latitude and longitude of the center of the anonymous group V center , correspondingly. Then we send service query to RSU to reduce communication cost and increase query efficiency. For example, a service request vehicle in radius R 0 queries service to get services set (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ). Our method query service, which will get services set (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p 5 , p 6 ). However, the method query service based on anonymous group, which will obtain a lot of query results such as (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p 11 , p 12 ). Subsequently, we store service p i to the list of services P for V when D 0 is less than R 0 . the service selection bundle calculates the distance D 0 of services and V in the service query result by using Eq. (9):
where (x p i , y p i ) are the latitude and longitude of p i , respectively. We propose the DAK algorithm based on the above analysis. This algorithm adaptively sets k in different contexts to provide k-anonymity efficiently and effectively through the user location privacy preferences model. Spreading into a large area (i.e., large CR) to improve the privacy level and accurately acquire services that the service request vehicle V requires is favorable. The main steps of the DAK algorithm are as follows:
1) Line 2 is the publishing of service for the vehicle;
Lines 24 and 26 are the service request phase. If the anonymous group succeeds, then we perform Line 24; otherwise, we execute Line 26; 2) Line 3 calculates the similarity among the different contexts to establish context similarity matrix P sim based on the user−context k-anonymous matrix; Line 4 obtains the nearest neighbor set M a = i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i e of the context a(1 ≤ q ≤ n) from P sim ;Lines 5 to 7 predict the k of the service requester vehicle V in context a; 3) Lines 8 to 10 acquire the location of n neighbor vehicles by multi-hop communication; Lines 11 to 22 select the dispersed neighbor vehicles to form the anonymous group; and Lines 29 to 34 form the service selection phase where we can bind the required service.
V. DLP ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a DLP algorithm for the vehicle density is sparse area. It contains the following steps: (1) establish the location privacy preference model to predict the k of the service requester vehicle, (2) generate dummy locations based on circle. (3) construct a large CR to achieve k-anonymity based on the location entropy and the distribution of the dummy positions, and (4) acquire accurate service.
A. ESTABLISH THE LOCATION PRIVACY PREFERENCE MODEL
First, according to the research work in section IV, vehicle users build a location privacy preference model, and predict user privacy requirement k through Eq.(4). The service requests vehicle obtain the location context information of n neighbor vehicles through the broadcast node discovery message during driving. When the distance between the service request vehicle and the neighbor vehicle node is satisfied Eq.(5), the location information of the neighbor vehicle is put into the information list L Register the service to RSU by service provider, and add it to Ser; 3: Calculate the context similarity matrix P sim through Eq. (1); 4: Get the nearest neighbor set M a = i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i e of the context a(1 ≤ q ≤ n); 5: for all (n i ∈ q) do 6: Predict the V 's k in context a through Eq.(3): 7: end for 8: while (n ≤ αk&&Eq.(5)) do 9: Store the location of the neighbor vehicle in L= {L 1 ,L 2 ,L 3 , · · · L n }, n ← |L|; 10: end while 11: if (n = αk) then 12: L ← {L V }; 13: for all (i ∈ n) do 14: Get the max distance D max between the V and the neighbor vehicle; 15: Add the neighbor vehicle's location L i to L, L ← {L V , L i }, m ← | L|; L← {L 1 ,L 2 ,L 3 , · · · ,L n }/L i ; 16: end for 17: for (i = 1; i < k − 1; i + +) do 18: Calculate the polygonal area S LiL , L i ∈ L formed by the anonymous group by Eq. (6); 19: if (S L iL , L i ∈ L is max) then 20: L ← {L i }, m ← | L|, L/L i ; 21: end if 22: end for 23: Compute the V_center through Eq. (7) and the actual query radius R through Eq. (8); 24: Send service request Req(V_id, V_type, V_center, R). 25 : else 26: Send a service request to RSU; Req(V_id, V_type, V_location, R 0 ); 27: end if 28: RSU returns the service query result P = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · p i }; 29: for all (p i ∈ P) do 30: Calculate D 0 by Eq. (9); 31: if (D 0 ≤ R 0 ) then 32: P ← P ∪ {p i }; 33: end if 34 : end for 35: return Serviceset P ;
B. GENERATE DUMMY LOCATIONS
When the collected number of vehicles satisfy n ≤ αk, we generate dummy location by introducing PAD VOLUME 8, 2020 algorithm [36] . We use an example shown in Fig. 5 to generate dummy location, where αk − n = 10, and L V is the real location of the service request vehicle. Firstly, we need to construct the center L c of the virtual circle by Eq.(10), which is randomly selected in this area.
where λ is the length of the local map, r 0 = d(L V , L c ) represents the Euclidean distance between the real position L V and the center L c of the virtual circle. r min is the minimum radius of the virtual circle, r is the radius of the virtual circle.
In order to ensure the cloaked region CR, this article can generate a virtual location by r min ≤ ρ = random(1) * r and the angle θ satisfies θ = L 1 L c L V = 2π αk − n. When ρ is close to r, the cloaked region is large. Based on this information, this paper calculates the candidate dummy locations L = L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , · · · , L 10 to construct the cloaked region by Eq (11) and Eq (12) . After the dummy locations are generated, it is merged with L into candidate anonymous group I.
where L i x and L i y are the latitude and longitude of the dummy location. And L c x and L c y are the latitude and longitude of the center of the virtual circle.
C. ANONYMOUS GROUP
Location entropy is used to measure anonymity, which indicates uncertainty in determining the user's true location. The larger the location entropy H is, the less likely the real location is to be identified by the attackers. Therefore, this paper first screens candidate anonymous group I according to location entropy. We choose a set of locations that have the same or similar probability with L V by Eq (13) and (14):
The main step to filter some locations in candidate anonymous group I based on location entropy is as follows:
1) This chosen map is divided into a grid of g × n cells, Where cell i is the i-th grid, and i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , g × n.
2) We can compute the query probabilities on each cell, where entropy is H i , all probability sums are 1; when the probability of each position is 1/k, the entropy reaches the maximum value H max = log 2 k; 3) We calculate the probability of the vehicle user in the corresponding cell,and get the probability and the nearest 3 2 k locations. At the same time, adding these locations to the anonymous vehicle collection W and renumber them, where W ← {W 1 ,W 2 , . . . ,W τ }, τ ← 3 2 k. Based on the existing research, this paper selects k-1 neighbor vehicles and vehicle V from W to form the final anonymous groupW based on the distribution of the positions of neighboring vehicles and vehicle V. When the larger area of the polygon formed by locations information inW is, the distribution of the locations is more dispersed, which can prevent the hidden vehicles of anonymous group from being too concentrated, so that the attacker can quickly infer the true location of V. The polygon area calculation formula is Eq. (15):
D. SERVICE QUERY AND SELECTION
In order to avoid using the regional query method to increase the communication cost and reduce the query efficiency of the nearest neighbor service query, the location information of the neighbor vehicle in the anonymous group is also avoided. Therefore, this paper uses Chapter IV Eq. (7) and Eq.(8) to calculate the center of the anonymous group V center = (x c , y c ) and query service radius R instead of the true location V location of the service request vehicle radius and initial query R 0 sent to the RSU. The RSU returns the service query result P = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · p i } through DssOSGi module. Then we calculate the position distance D 0 between the service in P and the V by Eq.(9), select the service which is satisfied, and store in the service list P to obtain an accurate query result for the user. Algorithm 2 describes steps of location-based privacy protection algorithm that are sparsely oriented towards vehicle density.
1)
Step 1 is the service registration phase. Steps 2 and 31 request service for the service request vehicle. If the anonymous group succeeds, then we perform Line 34; otherwise, we execute Line 36; 2) Step 3 predicts the privacy requirement k based on the user location privacy preference model. 5: while D > r min do 6: Store the location of the neighbor vehicle in L= {L 1 ,L 2 ,L 3 , · · · L n }, n ← |L|; 7: end while 8: if (n < αk) then 9: for all ρ ∈ αk − n do 10: Generate Dummy locations and add them to l by Eq. (5)(6)(7), ρ ← |L |; 11: end for 12: Merge list L and L to I ; 13: I ← {L V }; 14: for all i = 1;i ≤ αk;i + + do 15: Calculate q i of location in the set I by Eq.(9); 16: end for 17: for all i = 1;i ≤ αk;i + + do 18 :
end for 20: if H i is max then 21: Obtain an optimal set of dummy locations W ← {W 1 ,W 2 , . . . ,W τ }, τ ← 3 2 k; 22: end if 23: for all (i ∈ τ ) do 24: Get the max distance D max between the V and the neighbor vehicle; 25: Add the neighbor vehicle's location 26: end for 27: for (i = 1; i < k − 1; i + +) do 28: Calculate the polygonal area S W iW , W i ∈ W formed by the anonymous group by Eq. (6); 29: if (S W iW , W i ∈ W is max) then 30: W ← {W i }, m ← | W |, W /W i ; 31: end if 32: end for 33: Compute the V_center through Eq. (7) and the actual query radius R through Eq. (8); 34: Send service request Req(V_id, V_type, V_center, R). 35: else 36: Send a service request to RSU; Req(V_id, V_type, V_location, R 0 ); 37: end if 38: end if 39: RSU returns the service query result P = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · p i }; and the dummy locations are dispersed, and finally obtaining the hidden positions that can be published to the RSU and the actual query radius. 5) Steps 34 to 41 are the service binding process. The service request vehicle transmits the service content to the RSU, and the RSU returns the service data to the service request vehicle after entering service inquiry and matching. The service request vehicle obtains for desired neighborhood services based on the distance with the service provider.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed DAK and DLP algorithm by simulation.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
The experiment is simulated in the range of 8km × 8km, and the simulation parameters are presented in Table II . The real dataset from the Crawdad wireless network database is used for simulation [37] . The simulation environment consists of the PC hardware (Intel (R) Pentium (R) CPU 1.87 GHZ, 8.0 GB memory), the software environment for Windows 7 MyEclipse 10, the simulation platform, which is written in Java language, and the main part is displayed in Fig. 6 . In this platform, we abstract the urban road model as a combination of intersection and road. Vehicles at each intersection can travel in three ways: go straight, turn right and turn left. The average speed of the vehicle is between 5 m/s and 20 m/s, and the communication radius is 200 m. The service request process is described as follows: vehicle 20 requests a nearby restaurant service in a different context (Home, Food, Leisure, Mall, Hotel, School, and Hospital) and sends the request to the RSU to obtain the required services.
For fairness, all vehicles are believable. These vehicles must communicate with other vehicles to obtain location information gradually. Based on the limited information, we evaluate the system performance of different schemes. k is related to k-anonymity. The privacy level is favorable and the time required for finding the nearest neighbors is extended when k is large. We compare our algorithm with other schemes. The evaluation indexes are as follows: 1) Anonymous success rate refers to the ratio of successful anonymous users to the number of vehicles in the system. 2) The cloaked region area (CR) is the polygon area formed by the anonymous group. The anonymous area is dispersed and the privacy level is improved when the cloaked region area is large under the same conditions of k. 3) Service request success rate is the percentage of the total number of requests that are successfully requested within the simulation time. 4) Service query result is the average number of services returned by the RSU in different contexts, which is used to measure the communication cost. The communication cost is high when the number of query results is large. 5) Average response time refers to the average time that the V finishes the query service in different contexts. The query efficiency is high when the average response time is brief. 6) The average query accuracy indicates whether the user has access to the nearest neighbor service set that it requires. 7) Location entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of position. The greater the value of location entropy is, the higher the level of privacy protection is.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS ABOUT DAK ALGORITHM
We compare our DAK algorithm with the P2P and V-grid schemes. The P2P scheme represents a typical privacy protection method without relying on the centralized location anonymizer in [28] . The V-grid scheme represents the dummy selection algorithm for satisfying the k-anonymity in [38] . The parameters of P2P and V-grid are the same as those in our algorithm summarized in Table 3 . The simulation experiment adopts anonymous success rate, CR area, query result size, average response time, average query accuracy and service request success rate as evaluation indicators.
1) ANONYMOUS SUCCESS RATE
This experiment is aimed at analyzing the relationship between the number of vehicles and the success rate of anonymity, where k is 30. In Fig. 7 , the anonymous success rate of V-grid is constantly nearly 100% because the V-grid generates dummy locations based on a virtual grid, and the anonymous success rate improves with the increase in the number of vehicles in DAK and P2P. DAK and P2P require the location of the neighbor vehicles to construct the anonymous group by multi-hop communication. Thus, their anonymous success rates are affected by the density of vehicles. When number less than 200 vehicles, the anonymous success rate of our method is slightly lower than P2P, because we collected 2k neighbor vehicles location information. Our goal is to select k-1 location information, which can maximize the CR. But the number of vehicles in DAK and P2P are greater than 200, the success rates of DAK and P2P can achieve almost equal success nearly 100%. Our algorithm is mainly aimed at urban areas where the vehicle density is high. Therefore, the number of simulation vehicles is set to 200 in the next experiment to construct the bigger CR and obtain sufficient k.
2) CLOAKING REGION AREA AND SERVICE QUERY RESULTS
This experiment does not temporarily use the location privacy preference model to predict k, and V manually sets k from 5 to 30, which is convenient for us to evaluate the relationship between the CR and service query results with k. We first evaluate the cloaked region area provided by different schemes with increasing k because the location privacy level of a user is closely associated with the CR. Fig. 8 clearly illustrates that the cloaked region area of the three algorithms increases with k. Our algorithm and P2P require additional vehicles by multi-hop communication, thereby enlarging the CR. V-grid requires a large virtual grid with the increase of k to generate extra dummy locations. Our algorithm typically constructs a large CR than the P2P and V-grid schemes to enhance the privacy level under the same k because our DAK algorithm disperses the vehicle location distribution of the CR to form the anonymous group, whereas the P2P and V-grid methods generate dummy locations randomly. Fig. 9 also clearly depicts that the service query results of the three algorithms increase linearly with the increase of k. The increase of k indicates that additional vehicles should be found in this system, while the number of vehicles in the system does not increase. Therefore, the CR becomes large, thereby leading to further query results from the RSU. However, the proposed P2P and V-grid methods obviously obtain service query results, which imply higher consumption costs than in the DAK algorithm because the P2P and V-grid methods use anonymous areas rather than a cloaked location, which is used by our algorithm, to query service.
3) REQUEST SUCCESS RATE, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME AND QUERY ACCURACY OF THE QUERY SERVICE
In this experiment, we add the location privacy preference model to predict k in different contexts. Table 4 presents the k predicted by the DAK algorithm in seven locations. The table displays that k is different in the different contexts. Our algorithm DAK automatically predicts k in different contexts by analyzing the user's location privacy requirements. However, the k of the P2P and V-grid method remains unchanged, which is the default setting for the system, thereby resulting in poor user driving experience. Fig. 10 demonstrates that the DAK algorithm adapts k in different contexts, which reduces the number of service requests and improves the success rate. Thus, the service request success rate is higher in our DAK algorithm than in the P2P and the V-grid, and the request success rate of the DAK algorithm exceeds 90% in different contexts. Fig.11 illustrates the service query results in the different contexts based on different location privacy requirements, which are related to communication cost. In this figure, the DAK algorithm enlarges the query radius to improve the accuracy of service query. The service query results remain less in the DAK algorithm than in the P2P and V-grid methods with the query method based on the anonymous area. The query results are reduced because we use a single-point query, and our service query success rate is generally higher than the compared algorithm. Therefore, the DAK algorithm reduces communication cost more than the P2P and V-grid methods. Table 5 displays the average response time and query accuracy in different contexts using the DAK algorithm, P2P, and V-grid methods. The P2P method produces more service query results than the DAK algorithm, thereby requiring additional response time. Meanwhile, the DAK algorithm satisfies the user location privacy preference, that is, adaptively sets k under different contexts to improve the success rate of service requests and decrease the number of service requests for the user vehicles. Therefore, it can reduce the size of query results and response time. The location privacy preference model of the DAK algorithm is calculated offline, thereby reducing the response time of the online phase and the response time of entire query process. The DAK algorithm also filters the services returned by the RSU and then obtains services that the user requires, thus resulting in at least 99% query accuracy. Furthermore, the average query accuracy of the V-grid, which does not filter the service query results, is 87.24%.
C. EVALUATION RESULTS ABOUT DLP ALGORITHM
This section uses a set of simulation experiments to compare the effectiveness of the three methods of privacy protection with the study of vehicles seeking a nearby restaurant scene. The number of vehicles is 200 in this experiment. This paper compares DLP algorithm with V-cir [39] scheme and Random algorithm. The V-cir scheme is a simple method for generating a virtual location based on a circle and does not consider whether the user's privacy preference and the generated virtual location are too concentrated. Random algorithm randomly generates latitude and longitude of the virtual positions, and the latitude and longitude are any values in [0, r]. The parameter settings of the V-cir scheme and Random algorithm are the same as those of the DLP algorithm. The simulation experiment adopts the area of anonymous area, location entropy, query result size, query time, query accuracy and service request success rate as evaluation indicators. Location entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of position. The greater the value of location entropy is, the higher the level of privacy protection is.
1) CR AREA
The user's privacy level is closely related to area of the CR. Firstly, we evaluate the relationship between area of the CR and the user privacy requirement k in the same context by compared the DLP algorithm with the V-cir algorithm and the Random method. The area of CR is the area of the polygon formed by the vehicle user and k-1 neighbor vehicles. Under the same condition of k, the larger the area of CR, the denser distribution of vehicle locations in the anonymous group can be avoided to improve the privacy protection effect. As shown in Fig. 12 , when k is less than 20, both the area of CR of the DLP algorithm and the V-cir algorithm increase with the increase of the k. Because, as k increases, more dummy locations need to be generated, so that the larger the area of CR. When k is more than 20, the area of CR increases to the largest CR area. It can also be seen from the figure that the area of the CR area generated by the DLP algorithm is always larger than that of the V-cir algorithm and Random method, because our method considers whether locations distribution of anonymous group are concentrated to constructer bigger CR. Therefore, when k is the same, the privacy protection effect of DLP algorithm is better than the V-cir algorithm and the Random algorithm.
2) LOCATION ENTROPY
We evaluate the relationship between k and location entropy in the same context. Location entropy is a measure of location information uncertainty. The greater the value of location entropy is, the higher the uncertainty is. The location entropy is maximized when the vehicle user has the same or similar probability of being queried with the dummy locations in anonymous group. As shown in Fig. 13 , in general, the location entropy of all schemes increases with the change of k, while the Random algorithm performs worse than the DLP algorithm and the V-cir algorithm because the surrounding information is not taken into consideration. The dummy locations generated by Random algorithm may be in a mountain or river, which is easily identified by the attacker. 
3) QUERY RESULT SIZE
The query result size refers to the number of services returned by the RSU when the user initiates a query to the RSU. We evaluate the relationship between k and the size of the query results from the perspective of the size of the query results. As shown in Fig. 14, as the user privacy requirement k increases, the size of the query results increases significantly. This is because increasing k means that compared algorithms need to form a larger anonymous group, which in turn increase the size of the query results. Our DLP algorithm also increases the size of the query results, because of the formation of a larger CR area, resulting in a larger distance between the actual query location and the vehicle user's real location. However, as can be seen from Fig. 14, the query results of the DLP algorithm in this paper is far less than the comparison algorithm. Because we adopts the single-point query method, it only sends one location to the RSU, while compared algorithms need to transmit k independent locations, increasing the query result, thereby increasing the network transmission overhead.
4) QUERY TIME
The query time refers to the time when the user initiates a query to the RSU and the RSU returns to the service directory after query matching. The system then obtains the required service time after filtering. As shown in Fig. 14, as privacy requirement k of the vehicle user increases, the size of the query results increases significantly. This is because increasing k means that the user needs to generate a larger anonymous group to hide user's real location information. As a result, the size of the query results of the three algorithms increases with the increase of k, which will undoubtedly increase service matching time in RSU, service transmission time, and service filtering time in vehicle. Therefore, the service query time for the three algorithms increases with increasing k as shown in Fig. 15 . The query time of DLP algorithm in this paper is less than V-cir algorithm and Random algorithm, because this paper uses single-point query to send only one position to RSU, instead of sending k locations information to implement serve query. Table 6 shows the privacy requirements k for different contexts of vehicles at the same context. It can be known from Table 7 that the privacy requirement k of the DLP algorithm proposed in this paper is dynamically adjustable. The DLP algorithm predicts the k of the vehicle user in different contexts through location privacy preferences to predict whether the vehicle user prioritizes the level of location protection or prioritizes query efficiency. However, the value of k in different contexts is fixed for the V-cir and Random algorithm. Different vehicle users have different privacy preferences in different contexts, which will reduce the user's driving experience. As can be seen from Fig. 16 , the service request success rate of the DLP algorithm in this paper is generally higher than that of the V-cir algorithm and Random algorithm when requesting location services under different contexts, and the rate in this paper reaches 90%. Table 7 displays the average response time and query accuracy in different contexts using the DLP algorithm, V-cir algorithm, and Random algorithm.The DLP algorithm is smaller than the average response time and average query size of V-cir and Random methods, because the V-cir and Random methods use the k locations to query service, resulting in more query results transmission, thereby requiring additional response time. Meanwhile the DLP algorithm satisfies the user location privacy preference, that is, adaptively sets k under different contexts to improve the success rate of service requests and decrease the number of service requests for the user vehicles. Therefore, it can reduce the size of query results and the response time. The location privacy preference model of the DAK algorithm is calculated in offline, thereby reducing the response time of the online phase and the response time of the entire query process. The DLP algorithm also filters the services returned by the RSU and then obtains services that the user requires, thus resulting in at least 99% query accuracy. Furthermore, the average query accuracy of the V-cir and Random algorithm, which not filter the service query results, respectively are 69.51% and 75.35%.
5) SERVICE REQUEST SUCCESS RATE

VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the PP-OSGi middleware is designed to realize location privacy protection and shield the heterogeneity of the underlying equipments and the upper applications of different vehicles to make the system reusable and simplify the complexity of developing applications. The DAK and DLP algorithm are proposed to adaptively set k under different contexts to achieve k-anonymity for users and guarantee a large CR for different vehicle density. The experimental analysis shows that our proposed algorithms can predict the k in different contexts, thereby enhancing the privacy level in a short time, improving the service request success rate and driving experience, and reducing the communication cost without sacrificing the QoS. The vehicles involved in the collaboration can be trusted, and future research work on semi-trusted or untrusted vehicles in the system can be conducted.
At present, our proposed architecture is not optimized for vehicle communications, which can cause excessive delays in service requests in complex urban environments. And because the service request content in complex urban environment contains more rich private information, not encrypting all the information of the service request, thus ignoring the problem that the request content is stolen can also cause the user's privacy disclosure. In the future, on the one hand, we will introduce edge nodes and propose the architecture of the Internet of vehicles based on edge computing, optimize the communication model of the VANET to reduce service request and response delay; on the other hand, we will further study the location privacy mechanism to meet the complex urban environment, through the introduction of encryption to achieve the encryption of the entire service request content, so as to further guarantee the privacy of users and improve the anti-attack ability of the system. TAO ZHONG is currently pursuing the M.S. degree from the College of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, Hunan University, Changsha, China. Her major interests include VANET, middleware, and Location privacy protection. She is a member of Senior Member of China Computer Federation CCF. VOLUME 8, 2020 
